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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks are susceptible to small-but-specific adversar-
ial perturbations capable of deceiving the network. This vulnerabil-
ity can lead to potentially harmful consequences in security-critical
applications. To address this vulnerability, we propose a novel met-
ric called Gradient Similarity that allows us to capture the influence
of training data on test inputs. We show that Gradient Similarity
behaves differently for normal and adversarial inputs, and enables
us to detect a variety of adversarial attacks with a near perfect
ROC-AUC of 95-100%. Even white-box adversaries equipped with
perfect knowledge of the system cannot bypass our detector easily.
On the MNIST dataset, white-box attacks are either detected with a
high ROC-AUC of 87-96%, or require very high distortion to bypass
our detector.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to achieve par-human
performance over a wide array of classification tasks such as im-
age recognition and machine translation [24, 41]. However, despite
their recent successes, DNNs remain black-box systems due to a
limited theoretical understanding of their behavior. In general, a
lack of theoretical understanding of a system can be hazardous, as
the system may display unpredictable and potentially dangerous
behavior on atypical inputs. In the case of DNNs, the unpredictabil-
ity of their behavior enables an adversary to fool them into mis-
classification by adding small-but-specific perturbations to regular
inputs [9, 16, 35, 42]. The existence of this vulnerability raises criti-
cal questions about the reliability, robustness, and safety of DNNs,
especially in security-sensitive applications such as autonomous
vehicle perception, biometric authentication, medical diagnosis,
and malware detection.
Figure 1: Original inputs are shown in the first row and the
corresponding adversarial inputs in the second row. Each ad-
versarial input leads to an incorrect network classification.
Adversarial attacks against DNNs are particularly dangerous
as they lead to an incorrect prediction with very high network
confidence [16, 42] and the perturbations added to the inputs are
often imperceptible to human beings, as can be seen in Fig. 1. These
attacks can be targeted, i.e., the input can be misclassified into any
chosen output class, and also work in a black-box setting where
the adversary does not have access to the network’s parameters
[34, 35]. The existence of such adversarial inputs has also been
extended into the physical realm, where adversarial inputs remain
adversarial even after physical processing [4, 25, 38]. Given the
increasing use of DNNs in real-world applications, it is crucial to
design methods capable of detecting and preventing such attacks
in order to ensure safe and reliable deployment of DNNs.
To date there are no satisfactory defenses against adversarial
attacks on deep learning. Methods that rely on statistical properties
of adversarial inputs, e.g., manifold distance and principal com-
ponents [13, 29], are bypassed by an adversary that has perfect
knowledge of the system. Adversarial training [16], the method of
creating adversarial inputs and using them to train the network,
mainly protects against attack methods considered during training.
Robust optimization-based approaches that create provably-secure
networks are currently limited to small networks and provide guar-
antees that are insufficient for practical use [27, 36].
In this work, we draw from the theory of influence functions
to detect adversarial inputs. Influence functions are tools from ro-
bust statistics that measure the effect of a training point on a test
prediction and have recently been used to bring explainability to
predictions made by DNNs [22]. They have been used to ascribe
predictions back to training data, remove noise from data labels,
and can even be used to poison training data to decrease network
performance. Given the success of influence functions in explaining
regular predictions through the lens of training data, we seek to
shed light on the relationship between training data and adversar-
ial predictions using influence. Specifically, we ask the following
question:
Do training points influence predictions on adversarial
inputs differently than on normal inputs?
We answer this question in the affirmative and demonstrate that the
influence of training points can be used to distinguish adversarial
inputs from normal inputs, albeit at a high computational overhead.
To alleviate this overhead, we propose a new metric called Gradient
Similarity (GS) that captures influence at a lower computational
cost. Using this metric, we make the following contributions:
• We show that GS allows us to detect adversarial inputs with a
ROC-AUC close to 100%. Through cross-validation exper-
iments, we demonstrate the success of our detector against
unseen attacks.
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• We show that our detector is resilient towhite-box attacks.
On the MNIST dataset [26], white-box attacks are either
detected with aROC-AUC of 87-96% or require substantial
adversarial distortion to bypass our detector.
The paper is organized as follows: we provide a brief survey of
existing adversarial attacks and defenses in Section 2. In Section 3,
we specify the threat model and notation used in the paper. Section 4
introduces our new metric Gradient Similarity, its connections with
the theory of influence functions, and an explanation of how we use
Gradient Similarity to detect adversarial inputs. After describing our
experimental setup in Section 5, we evaluate our detector against
zero-knowledge and perfect-knowledge adversaries in Section 6 and
7 respectively. We conclude and discuss directions for future work
in Section 8.
2 RELATEDWORK
We provide a brief overview of existing adversarial attack methods
and defenses in this section. A more comprehensive explanation of
the attacks is deferred to Section 5.3.
2.1 Adversarial attacks
DNNs are vulnerable to small-but-specific perturbations [16, 42]
which when added to the input, cause them to misclassify at a
very high rate. The success of these attacks detracts from the
high accuracy DNNs achieve in a wide variety of tasks, and from
their resilience to random noise [12]. A number of efficient at-
tack algorithms have been developed to create such adversarial
inputs [9, 16, 25, 30, 31, 34, 35]. Goodfellow et al. developed the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) that perturbs the input in the
direction that maximizes loss in a single step [16]. Kurakin et al.
developed Basic Iterative Method (BIM) that enhanced the FGSM
attack by performing it iteratively, and taking a small step in the
direction maximizing loss at each iteration [25]. While these attacks
lead to untargeted mis-classification, Papernot et al. introduced the
Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) to mis-classify an input to a
pre-specified target class [35]. Further, Papernot et al. showed that
such attacks can also be launched when the attacker does not have
access to the internal parameters of the victim network [34]. As
opposed to gradient-based attacks that use a linear approximation
of the loss surface, Carlini and Wagner (C&W) utilized optimiza-
tion to generate adversarial inputs with minimal perturbation [9].
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. created the DeepFool (DF) attack that uses
a linear approximation of the decision boundary to find adversarial
perturbations even when other attacks fail [31]. Such attacks have
been demonstrated against neural networks designed for tasks like
image and object recognition [16, 42], speech recognition [6], and
malware classification [18].
Adversarial attacks can also be successfully launched in the
physical world even though the attacker has less control over the
input features. For example, Kurakin et al. showed that adversarial
perturbations remain adversarial even when they are processed
by physical media [25]. Sharif et al. [38] designed adversarial eye-
frames that an attacker can wear to fool a facial recognition system
in a live setting. Eykholt et al. were able to create adversarial road
signs that were misclassified by the computer vision system present
in a moving car [11]. Carlini et al. demonstrated the success of
adversarial attacks against voice assistants, e.g. Google Now, by
adding inaudible perturbations to voice commands [6]. Athalye
et al. generated a 3-D printed adversarial object which fooled a
classifier from a wide-range of view points and angles [4]. Grosse
et al. crafted adversarial inputs to fool neural networks built to
classify malware [18]. The success of these attacks in fooling DNNs
presents a major roadblock to their safe and reliable deployment.
Due to the adverse ramifications of such attacks and their impli-
cations on the safety of deep learning systems, a number of defenses
have been proposed in the literature.
2.2 Defenses against adversarial attacks
Defenses can generally be divided into two categories: a) defenses
that detect adversarial inputs and b) defenses that train networks
that are robust to adversarial inputs.
Several adversarial detectors have been proposed in the litera-
ture that rely on differences in statistical properties of adversarial
and normal inputs. Hendrycks and Gimpel [21] discovered that ad-
versarial inputs have abnormally large magnitudes of low-ranked
principal components and used that to separate them from normal
inputs. Bhagoji et al. used similar data transformations to prevent
adversarial attacks [1]. Xu et al. used “feature-squeezing”, a method
of reducing the range of values an input can have, to increase the
distortion required for adversarial attacks [44]. Feinman et al. used
Bayesian uncertainty estimates and the density of hidden layer
representations to separate normal and adversarial inputs [13]. Pa-
pernot and McDaniel used a k-nearest neighbors approach to detect
adversarial samples [33]. Metzen et al. and Grosse et al. trained
a classifier to detect adversarial inputs [17, 29]. Meng and Chen
proposed a two-pronged defense that first used manifold represen-
tations to differentiate normal inputs from adversarial inputs [28].
Then, they created a secondary network to push the adversarial
inputs back to the manifold of the normal data. Most of these de-
tectors however rely on statistical properties that are not clearly
explainable and may vary from one dataset to another. Further, it
was shown that the above detectors can be bypassed by an adver-
sary that can adapt to the defense [7, 8]. He et al. further showed
that combining a number of weak statistical detectors together also
does not lead to a strong detector as an attacker can successfully
break an ensemble detector [19].
A different approach to defending against adversarial attacks is
to build networks that are robust to such attacks. One technique to
do so is adversarial training [16] in which the network designer gen-
erates adversarial inputs and uses them during training with correct
labels. Adversarial training succeeds in thwarting attacks that were
considered during training but is ineffective on other attacks [43].
Tramer et al. extended adversarial training by generating adver-
sarial perturbations on other networks and incorporating those
perturbations in the training of the original network [43]. Papernot
et al. proposed to use distillation as a defense [34] which uses a
secondary network trained on soft probability labels. However, this
approach was found to be ineffective against optimization-based
attacks [9]. Recently, robust optimization has been incorporated in
network training to build classifiers that are provably resilient to
adversarial attacks [20, 27, 36]. Madry et al. [27] trained networks
with an additional constraint of minimizing the maximum loss in
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the neighborhood of an input which allowed them to train networks
that are robust against adversaries that rely on a first-order approx-
imation of the loss surface. Raghunathan et al. [36] developed a
differentiable upper-bound on the worst-case loss and were able to
minimize it during training to design certifiably robust networks.
While robust optimization-based approaches show that training
provably-secure neural networks is possible, currently these ap-
proaches are limited to small networks and their guarantees are
not sufficient for practical use.
We build a detector based on the concept of influence functions.
Influence functions try to explain network predictions via the lens
of training points [22]. Our detector maintains the explainability
of influence functions, achieves high detection rates on numerous
adversarial attacks, and is resilient to adaptive attackers. In the next
section, we specify the threat network considered in this work and
the notation used throughout the paper.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Threat model
Goal of the attacker: Given a normal input, the goal of the at-
tacker is to create a perturbation, which when added to the input,
causes misclassification. For an input x, belonging to class i such
that i ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, where K is the number of classes, misclassifi-
cation can be
• Untargeted: where the adversarial input can be classified
to any class j such that j ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and j , i
• Targeted: where the adversarial input must be misclassified
to a pre-specified class j such that j ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and j , i
Capabilities of the attacker: Adversarial capabilities are deter-
mined by two factors: the amount of control the attacker has over
the input and the amount of knowledge the attacker has about
the network and defense. In all cases, we assume that the attacker
has complete control of the network input; i.e., the attacker can
change any input feature. However, the attacker is constrained
by the maximum amount of perturbation that he can add to the
input to remain undetected. The adversarial perturbation budget is
measured in terms of the maximum permissible norm (L1, L2, or
L∞) of the perturbation. The amount of knowledge the adversary
possesses about the network’s internal parameters, architecture,
and defense leads to three different adversarial scenarios [5, 7].
• Zero-knowledge adversary: A zero-knowledge adversary has
access to the network’s internal parameters and architecture,
but has no knowledge that a defense is in place. We refer to
attacks launched by such an adversary as “grey-box” attacks.
• Perfect-knowledge adversary: A perfect-knowledge adversary
has complete knowledge of the network’s parameters, archi-
tecture, and the defense. This adversary can therefore adapt
his attack strategy to account for the defense. This is the
strongest possible threat model. Attacks crafted by such an
adversary are known as “white-box” attacks.
• Limited-knowledge adversary: A limited-knowledge adver-
sary knows that the network is being defended with a given
scheme. However, the adversary does not have any knowl-
edge of the network’s parameters, training data, or the de-
fense’s parameters. Attacks launched by such an adversary
are called “black-box” attacks.
In this paper, we do not consider “black-box” attacks as they are
the most difficult for an adversary [7].
3.2 Notation
We use the following standard notation throughout the paper.
• C = {1, 2, . . . ,K} is the set of classes.
• Fθ (·) represents the network, where θ are the parameters
of the network.
• x ∈ Rn represents the network input. yˆ = Fθ (x), where
yˆ ∈ [0, 1]K is the network output representing a probability
vector over K classes. The predicted class for an input x is
computed as arg max(yˆ).
• L(θ , x, y) represents the loss function for Fθ on input xwith
respect to the label y. We use categorical cross-entropy as
the loss function unless specified otherwise.
• Xtr andYtr represent the set of training points and training
labels, respectively.
• The symbol ∇ represents the Jacobian; i.e. the first derivative
and ∇2 represents the Hessian; i.e. the second derivative.
The subscript of these symbols represents the variable with
respect to which the derivative is computed.
• clip(·) represents the clipping function. For z ∈ R:
clip(z) =

MIN if z < MIN
z if MIN ≤ z ≤ MAX
MAX if z > MAX
The permissible range of z is [MIN,MAX] and is defined a
priori. The clip function is applied element-wise to a vector.
• sign(·) represents the sign function. For z ∈ R:
sign(z) =

−1 if z < 0
0 if z = 0
1 if z > 0
The function is applied element-wise to a vector.
• We use subscript index notation to index a vector. For in-
stance x[i] indicates the ith element of the vector x.
4 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INFLUENCE AND SIMILARITY
The theoretical understanding of neural networks is currently lim-
ited leads to questions about the explainability of decisions made
by them. Recently, Koh and Liang used the concept of influence
functions to explain the test-time predictions made by a neural
network through the lens of its training data [22].
4.1 Influence Functions
Influence functions is a tool from robust statistics that provide a
way to measure the effect of each training point on the network’s
test time behavior [10]. Specifically, they measure the change in
network loss at a test input when the weight of a specific training
point is changed during training. Koh and Liang [22] formalized
this concept for DNNs and provided a closed-form expression to
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measure the influence of a training point on the network loss at a
test input. We provide a brief overview of their key results.
Consider the network risk,
R(θ ) = 1|Xtr |
∑
x∈Xtr
y∈Ytr
L(θ , x, y)
The goal of network training is to find parameters θ∗ that mini-
mize the network risk. Therefore,
θ∗ = arg min
θ
R(θ )
Assuming that R(θ ) is convex and differentiable, we have,
∇θR(θ∗) = 0
Increasing the weight of a specific training point x∗ by a small
amount ϵ ∈ R leads to a new risk function
Rx∗,ϵ (θ ) = R(θ ) + ϵL(θ , x∗, y∗)
Note that setting ϵ = − 1|Xtr | is equivalent to leaving the training
point x∗ out of the training data. The above formulation leads to a
different set of optimal parameters
θ∗x∗,ϵ = arg min
θ
Rx∗,ϵ (θ )
Koh and Liang were able to measure the change in optimal
network parameters due to up-weighting x∗ by an infinitesimally
small ϵ as
∂
∂ϵ
θ∗x,ϵ = −H−1θ ∗ · ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗)
where Hθ∗ = ∇2θR(θ )|θ=θ ∗ represents the Hessian matrix of the
network risk with respect to the network parameters [22]. Koh and
Liang defined the influence of a training point, x∗, on the loss at a
test input, x′ as
I(x∗, x′) def= ∂
∂ϵ
L(θ∗, x′, y′)

ϵ=0
= −∇θL(θ∗, x′, y′)T · H−1θ ∗ · ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗)
Thus, the quantity − 1|Xtr |I(x
∗, x′) measures the change in net-
work loss at x′ when the training point x∗ has been left out from
training.
4.2 Gradient Similarity
While − 1|Xtr |I(x
∗, x′) provides a precise analytical formulation to
measure the influence of removing a training point, on the loss
at a test input, it is a computationally expensive metric. In order
to address this issue, we define a new metric that captures the
alignment of loss surfaces at training point x∗, and a test input x′,
called Gradient Similarity as:
GS(x∗, x′) def= ∇θL(θ∗, x′, y′)T · ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗)
Since −1|Xtr | is a constant, we note that the main difference between
influence and gradient similarity is that gradient similarity replaces
the vector H−1
θ ∗ · ∇θL(θ
∗, x∗, y∗) with the vector ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗).
Hence, a scaling relationship between these metrics is possible if
H−1
θ ∗ · ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗) = λ.∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗)
for a constant λ. To show equivalence between influence and gra-
dient similarity, we only need to show that the vectors H−1
θ ∗ ·
∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗) and ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗) are scaled versions of one an-
other. That is, for a fixed set of training points
(1) the ratio of norms of the two vectors is constant.
(2) the cosine of the angle between the two vectors is 1.
In order to verify these two properties experimentally, we ran-
domly select a set of 1000 training points from the MNIST dataset
[26].
For (1), we compute the ratio | |∇θ L(θ
∗,x∗,y∗) | |2
| |H−1
θ ∗ ·∇θ L(θ
∗,x∗,y∗) | |2 across the
training points. In our experiments, the ratio was found to be in
the range [99.04225, 107.24023], with mean: 100.20286, median:
99.98809 and variance ≈ 0. We illustrate this effect in Fig. 2 as well.
The experiment validates that the ratio of the norms of the two
vectors is close to being constant.
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Figure 2: Norms of ∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗) (Original) and H−1θ ∗ ·
∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗) (Transformed). The plot illustrates the linear
relationship between the two vector norms.
For (2) we compute the cosine-similarity between vectors H−1
θ ∗ ·
∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗) and∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗).We find that the cosine-similarity
is in the range [0.99938, 1.0], with mean: 0.99982, median: 0.99986
and variance ≈ 0. These results experimentally validate that the
two vectors are parallel and scaled versions of each other. Note
that we expect to see some variance in our results as we use an
approximation to H−1
θ ∗ using Hessian Vector Products (HVP) [22].
These two observations corroborate the equivalence of gradient
similarity and influence in measuring relative geometries of the
loss surface at a test input and a training point. This equivalence
also allows gradient similarity to maintain the explainability of the
influence function metric. 1
1 The role of the H−1
θ ∗ in scaling the gradient vectors also raises theoretical questions
about neural network training. For a matrix A, vector x, and a fixed constant λ, Ax =
λx if and only if λ is an eigenvalue ofA and x is an eigenvector ofA. For an eigenvalue
λ, set of all vectors x such that Ax = λx form an eigenspace. Our observations about
H−1
θ ∗ and ∇θ L(θ
∗, x∗, y∗) allude to the possibility that ∇θ L(θ ∗, x∗, y∗) may form
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For a fixed training point, gradient similarity can also be further
decomposed into two features that are determined solely by the
test input: 1) the norm of the gradient vector at the test input and
2) cosine-similarity of the gradient vectors at the test input and the
training point. In the section below, we ask if these features can
be used to distinguish adversarial and normal inputs.We answer
this question in the affirmative.
4.3 Using Gradient similarity to detect
adversarial inputs
Equipped with gradient similarity, which serves as a proxy for
influence functions, we ask the following question:
Does Gradient similarity behave differently for adversarial
inputs than for normal inputs ?
This question essentially asks if there is a fundamental difference
between the properties of the loss surface at normal and adversar-
ial inputs. If such a difference exists, then normal inputs would
possibly be separable from adversarial inputs. Note that gradient
similarity between a test input x′, and training point x∗ can be
further decomposed as:
GS(x∗, x′) = | |∇θL(θ∗, x′, y′)| |2 | |∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗)| |2 cos(αx∗,x′)
where, αx∗,x′ is the angle between the two gradient vectors. In order
to measure gradient similarity for a fixed training point with differ-
ent test inputs, we can ignore | |∇θL(θ∗, x∗, y∗)| |2 as it is constant.
Therefore, the decomposition of gradient similarity allows us to
analyze the geometry of the loss surface at x′ using the two features
defined below
N(x′) def= | |∇θL(θ∗, x′, y′)| |2
C(x∗, x′) def= cos(αx∗,x′)
We experimentally study the behavior of these features for normal
and adversarial inputs and show that these features allow us to
separate adversarial inputs from normal inputs. First, we describe
our experimental setup in the next section.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
5.1 Datasets
We consider three datasets for our experiments:
1. MNIST: A dataset of 28×28, gray-scale handwritten images
containing digits from 0-9 [26]. The dataset contains a total
of 70,000 images with ground-truth labels, where the labels
can be any digit from 0-9.
2. CIFAR2: A dataset of colored images of size 32 × 32 × 3,
where the last dimension is for color channels. Since net-
works that achieve high accuracy on CIFAR10 have a very
large parameter space, we adapt our dataset from CIFAR10
[23] in order to meet our computational resource constraints.
To create CIFAR2, we randomly picked two classes from
CIFAR10 and used the resulting data for our experiments.
Hence, CIFAR2 contains data for two classes with 6000 im-
ages for each class.
an eigenspace of H−1
θ ∗ and hence, of its inverse Hθ ∗ , the Hessian of R(θ
∗). The cause
of this phenomenon is unknown to us and requires further exploration.
3. DREBIN: An Android malware dataset of applications on
the Android platform. The dataset contains 123,453 benign
applications and 5,560 malicious applications. Each applica-
tion is represented by a set of binary features collected via
malware analysis performed as per [3, 40].
5.2 Network setup
We briefly describe the network architecture for each network used
in our experiments.
• MNIST: We use a Convolutional neural network (CNN) with
2 convolutional layers, and 2 fully connected layers, for a
total of 4 layers. At each layer, we use the ReLU activation
function. The first convolutional layer uses 32 channels, and
the second convolutional layer uses 64 channels. Both con-
volutional layers use a kernel of size 5 × 5 with no padding.
We apply dropout with probability 0.5, after the the second
convolutional layer, and the first fully connected layer. In
order to turn the scores of the second fully connected layer
into probabilities, we apply the standard softmax function.
The network achieves an accuracy of 99.30 % on a holdout
test set of 6055 samples.
• CIFAR2: We use the same network architecture as MNIST
with the following changes. Each convolutional layer uses
a kernel size of 3×3 with padding added in order to ensure
that the output size of the convolutional layer is the same as
its input size. The network achieves an accuracy of 98.72 %
on a holdout test set of 1218 samples.
• DREBINWe use a Fully-Connected network with 4 layers.
At each layer we apply the ReLU activation function, fol-
lowed by dropout with probability 0.5. The network achieves
an accuracy of 97.37 % on a holdout test set of 3913 samples.
Our code and trained models have been made publicly available.
5.3 Attacks
We consider six different attacks: for the untargeted setting, we
consider FGSM [16], two versions of the BIM [25] attack: BIM-A
and BIM-B, and the DeepFool attack [31]. In the targeted setting, we
consider the JSMA [35] attack and the C&W attack [9]. While these
attacks traditionally assume the input features to be continuous,
this assumption is violated for DREBIN dataset, in which input
features take binary values. Therefore, the attack algorithms have
to be modified to work on DREBIN inputs.
FGSM: FGSM [16] computes the gradient of the model loss with
respect to input features and perturbs each feature in a way that
increases model loss. The parameter ϵ controls the amount of per-
turbation added to each feature. For an input x and its true label y,
the corresponding adversarial input xadv is computed as:
xadv = clip(x + ϵ .sign(∇xL(θ∗, x, y)))
For DREBIN, we select all the input features x[i] for which
sign(∇xL(θ∗, x, y))) > 0
We then flip those feature values by changing 0 to 1, or 1 to 0.
BIM-A, BIM-B: Basic Iterative Method is an iterative version of
the FGSM attack such that it applies a smaller perturbation in each
iteration [25]. There are two possible versions of this attack: BIM-A,
5
Dataset Original FGSM BIM-A BIM-B JSMA C&W DF
Acc. L2 Acc. L2 Acc. L2 Acc. L2 Acc. L2 Acc. L2 Acc.
MNIST 100.00% 5.74 9.00% 2.49 0.50 % 4.62 0.50 % 4.69 2.10 % 3.64 0.40 % 1.66 0.40 %
CIFAR2 98.50 % 5.43 0.00 % 1.32 0.00 % 4.42 0.00 % 3.66 1.50 % 2.01 5.00 % 1.03 1.50 %
DREBIN 91.00 % 615.04 50.00 % 1.00 0.00 % 2.40 25.00 % 1.33 0.00 % – – % – – %
Table 1: Prediction accuracy of our undefended networks on the original inputs and their adversarial versions. We also report
the average L2 distortion of the misclassified inputs.
where the adversary stops the iterations as soon as misclassification
is achieved and BIM-B, where the adversary keeps iterating for a
fixed number of iterations. For DREBIN, we update BIM-A and
BIM-B by selecting the input feature x[i] at each iteration such that
i = arg max
i
(∇xL(θ∗, x, y)[i])
We then flip the feature value from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0.
JSMA: While FGSM and BIM attacks lead to untargeted misclas-
sification, Papernot et al. developed an iterative method to achieve
misclassification of an input to any pre-specified class. Their at-
tack takes the target class t as input and outputs an adversarial
sample xadv such that arg max (Fθ ∗ (xadv)) = t . In each iteration of
the algorithm, a Jacobian-based saliency map S(x, t) is created and
the feature with the max value in this map, is perturbed by ϵ . The
saliency map is created as follows:
S(x, t)[i] =

0, if ∂(Fθ ∗ (x)[t ])∂xi < 0 or
∑
j,t
∂(Fθ ∗ (x)[j ])
∂xi
> 0
∂(Fθ ∗ (x)[t ])
∂xi
 ∑j,t ∂(Fθ ∗ (x)[j ])∂xi
 , otherwise
For DREBIN, we modify JSMA, so as to flip the feature values from
0 to 1, or 1 to 0 in the perturb step. Further, we only modify each
input feature at most once.
C &W: Carlini and Wagner built an optimization-based attack
where the goal is to find the smallest perturbation that can cause a
misclassification [9]. The C&W attack works in both targeted and
untargeted settings and works with a variety of distance metrics.
Here we only consider their L2 attack which can be described as
an optimization problem:
min
xadv
| |xadv − x| |2 + c · д(xadv)
where,
д(xadv) = max(max{Z (xadv)[i] : i , t} − Z (xadv)[t ],−κ),
Z () represent the pre-softmax outputs or logits of the network.
κ represents the minimum acceptable network confidence for the
adversarial perturbation, and c is a weighting constant used during
optimization.
DeepFool: Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [31] used a linear approxi-
mation of the network decision boundary. Their algorithm works
in an iterative manner, and at each iteration finds the perturbation
that brings the input closest to a linear approximation of the deci-
sion boundary. The algorithm terminates once misclassification is
achieved.
In our experiments, the following attack parameters were used:
• MNIST: We set ϵ = 0.3 for FGSM, BIM-A, and BIM-B. For
BIM-A, and BIM-B, we set the maximum iterations to 10. For
C&W we set the maximum iterations to 100.
• CIFAR2: We use the same attacks and settings as in MNIST,
however we set ϵ = 0.1 as a higher ϵ leads to images that
are unrecognizable even by human beings.
• DREBINWe test the DREBIN network on the modified ver-
sions of FGSM, BIM-A, BIM-B, and JSMA. We use 10 itera-
tions for BIM-A, BIM-B.
We use a modified version of the cleverhans library [32] to imple-
ment our attacks and include the modified version in our publicly
available source code. Table 1 reports the accuracy of our unde-
fended networks on these attacks and the average L2 distortion
added by each attack. Clearly, these attacks succeed in fooling our
undefended networks at a high rate. Sample adversarial images cre-
ated by these attacks for MNIST and CIFAR datasets are displayed
in Fig. 3.
6 DETECTING GREY-BOX ATTACKS
Zero-knowledge adversaries have access to the networks’s parame-
ters and architecture but do not have any knowledge of the defense
mechanism. To evaluate the efficacy of our approach against such
adversaries, we first analyze the behavior of the N(x′) and C(x, x′)
for normal and adversarial inputs. To do so, we select a random
subset of training points and test inputs from each dataset. For each
normal test input we create the corresponding adversarial input
for each attack method. For all test inputs, the values of N(x′) are
visualized in Fig. 4(a). As can be seen, the norm of the gradient
vectors is low for all normal points and high for all adversarial
points except for BIM-B. We also plot max
w∈Xtr
C(w, x′) for each of
the test inputs in Fig 4(b). The graph shows that the max cosine-
similarity values are close to 1 for normal inputs and smaller for
adversarial inputs from all attack methods, including BIM-B. One
can note from the graph that the norm and max cosine-similarity
for gradient vectors at the original test inputs lie in a separate band
as compared to their adversarial counterparts.
We also highlight the above phenomenon by evaluating the
percentage of test inputs for which the norm ratio: N(x
′
adv)
N(x′) > 1.
We do the same for max cosine-similarity and evaluate the per-
centage of test inputs for which the max cosine-similarity ratio:
max
w∈Xtr
C(w, x′adv)
max
w∈Xtr
C(w, x′) < 1.
As reported in Table 2, for all attack methods except BIM-B, the
norm of the gradient vector of an adversarial input is larger than
the norm of the gradient vector for the corresponding normal input.
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Figure 3: Grey-box adversarial images for MNIST and CIFAR2
This behavior is caused by the fact that adversarial inputs crafted
by most attack methods are close to the classification boundary.
This in turn means that the loss at those inputs is sensitive to a
small change in the network parameters and therefore, the norm
of gradient vectors for such inputs is higher. The BIM-B attack
pushes inputs farther away from the classification boundary and
into regions of the decision surface that are not as sensitive to
changes in the classification boundary. Therefore, the gradient
vectors of adversarial inputs created by BIM-B display a smaller
norm.
Input MNIST CIFAR2 DREBIN
N(x′adv)
N(x′) > 1
N(x′adv)
N(x′) > 1
N(x′adv)
N(x′) > 1
FGSM 95 % 21% 10 %
BIM-A 98 % 93% 44%
BIM-B 64 % 2% 50 %
JSMA 99 % 99 % 40%
C& W 99 % 88 % –
DF 99 % 100 % –
Table 2: Fraction of adversarial inputs having higher gradi-
ent norm compared to their normal counterparts. x repre-
sents the original input and x′ represents the adversarial ver-
sion of that input.
In contrast, the maximum cosine-similarity for a normal input
is found to be higher than its adversarial counterpart for all attack
method as reported in Table 3, including BIM-B. This suggests a
lack of alignment between the loss surface at adversarial inputs
and the loss surface at training points.
Given the above observations, we build a detector that utilizes
cosine-similarity values as features in order to detect adversarial
inputs. More specifically, we use a logistic regression detector that
outputs a binary label indicating whether an input is adversarial or
normal. The input to the detector is a feature vector consisting of
Input MNIST CIFAR2 DREBIN
MC( xadv)
MC(x′) < 1
MC( xadv)
MC(x′) < 1
MC( xadv)
MC(x′) < 1
FGSM 93 % 69 % 100%
BIM-A 97% 79% 100%
BIM-B 93 % 64% 100 %
JSMA 98 % 87% 100%
C& W 98 % 82 % –
DF 98 % 84 % –
Table 3: Fraction of adversarial inputs with lower maxi-
mum cosine-similarity than the corresponding normal in-
puts. Here, we use MC( x′) = max
w∈Xtr
C(w, x′) , where themax-
imum is taken over all the training points w. x represents
the original input and x′ represents the adversarial version
of that input.
the cosine-similarity values for a test input with a fixed subset of the
training data. We train the detector on feature vectors created from
a mixture of normal inputs and adversarial inputs. The performance
of our detector, measured in ROC-AUC, on each grey-box attack
is found to be very high, as reported in Table 5. Even when the
adversarial class was composed of inputs created using different
attack algorithms, the detector was able to detect all adversarial
inputs with near-perfect ROC-AUC. For these scenarios, the ROC
curves are presented in Fig. 5 and the ROC-AUC values are reported
as 1.0 for MNIST, .9966 for CIFAR2, and 1.0 for DREBIN.
In order to test whether our approach is able to detect new
adversarial attacks, we perform leave-one-out cross validation. In
this scenario, we train the detector on regular inputs and adversarial
inputs from five out of the six grey-box attackmethods.We then test
the detector on normal inputs and on adversarial inputs from the
sixth attack method that was left out during training. We report the
results of this experiment in Table. 4. As can be seen, our detector
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Figure 4: Geometric properties of the network loss surface
for MNIST. As can be seen in (a) the norm of gradient vec-
tors for the normal inputs forms a band below the norms
for the corresponding adversarial inputs. Similarly in (b) we
show that the gradient vectors at the normal inputs have a
higher cosine-similarity to training points than their adver-
sarial counterparts.
Dataset FGSM BIM-A BIM-B JSMA C&W DF
Acc. Acc. Acc. Acc. Acc. Acc.
MNIST 99.27 97.22 78.06 97.69 96.65 99.90
CIFAR2 98.10 97.60 99.50 98.55 97.14 99.51
DREBIN 98.18 100.00 93.75 100.00 – –
Table 4: Leave-one-out cross validation: For each dataset and
grey-box attack, we report the accuracy (in %) of our detector
in detecting the grey-box attack that was left out from the
training set of the detector.
shows high accuracy in detecting each attack that was left out from
its training set.
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Figure 5: ROC curves for logistic regression grey-box detec-
tor
7 DETECTINGWHITE-BOX ATTACKS
One of the biggest challenges in detecting adversarial inputs is the
inability of most detectors to withstand perfect-knowledge adver-
saries [7]. Adversaries equipped with knowledge of the network
parameters, architecture, and defense can create adversarial inputs
that mimic properties of normal inputs that detectors rely on. It has
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Dataset FGSM BIM-A BIM-B JSMA C&W DF
L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC
MNIST 5.74 99.96% 2.49 100.00% 4.62 99.56% 4.69 100.00% 3.64 100.00% 1.66 100.00%
CIFAR2 5.43 99.00% 1.32 99.00% 4.42 100.00% 3.66 100.00% 2.01 100.00% 1.03 100.00%
DREBIN 615.04 100.00 % 1.00 100.00 % 2.40 100.00 % 1.33 100.00 % – – % – – %
Table 5: Grey-box Detection: The first sub-column shows the average L2 distortion of an adversarial input and the second
sub-column lists the ROC-AUC of the logistic regression detector.
Original
WB-1 C&W
WB-2 C&W
WB-2 FGSM
WB-2 BIM-A
WB-2 BIM-B
Figure 6: White-box adversarial images for MNIST and CIFAR2
Dataset WB-1 C&W WB-2 C&W WB-2 FGSM WB-2 BIM-A WB-2 BIM-B
L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC L2 AUC
MNIST 6.17 93.14% 4.13 96.40% 9.79 96.40% 10.85 96.40% 10.99 87.45%
CIFAR2 5.47 56.83% 4.47 56.49% 5.61 50.99% 5.16 59.00% 4.61 50.00%
Table 6: White-box detection: The first sub-column shows the average L2 distortion of succcessful adversarial inputs and the
second sub-column lists the ROC-AUC of the threshold detector.
been argued that a perfect-knowledge adversary is an impractical
threat model as machine learning systems are typically deployed as
black-boxes. However, network parameters and training data can
be leaked even in a black-box setting through model inversion and
membership inference attacks [14, 39]. While privacy-enhancing
technologies, such as differential privacy [2], can prevent such
leakage, network parameters can still be leaked by an insider with
access to the network. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate the robust-
ness of adversarial detectors against perfect-knowledge adversaries.
We evaluate the efficacy of our detector under two different types
of white-box attacks that can be launched by a perfect-knowledge
attacker. These attack methods are inspired by white-box attacks de-
veloped by Carlini and Wagner [7], Sabour et al. [37], and Ghorbani
et al. [15].
For the perfect-knowledge attacker, we build a detector that uses
max
w∈Xtr
( C(w, x′) ) and N(x′) as features for a test input x′, and sets
thresholds for both features that separate normal and adversarial
inputs. The attacker is aware of the features and thresholds that
are being used. With this knowledge, the attacker can create his
adversarial inputs either in one phase or two phases. The attack is
considered successful only if the adversarial input is mis-classified
by the network and is labeled as normal by the detector.
One-phase attack: Here the approach of the adversary is to
create a single objective function that can be optimized to the
cause mis-classification and bypass the detector simultaneously.
For our detector, the goal of the attacker is to craft adversarial
inputs that also have a small norm of the loss gradient and high
cosine-similarity with at least one training point of the target class.
To do so, the attacker must craft an x′ such that N(x′) is mini-
mized and C(xд , x′) is maximized with respect to a guide input xд .
The guide input xд can be selected by the adversary as the input
with which the original input, x, already has the highest cosine-
similarity; i.e., xд = arg max
w∈Xtr
( C(w, x)). These two additional terms
can be incorporated in the optimization framework of the C&W
attack to create the white-box C&W attack (WB-1 C&W). Let l(x′)
represent the objective function to be minimized by a regular C&W
attack to cause misclassification. Then, the updated objective func-
tion for the WB-1 C&W attack can be formulated as:
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l˜(x′) = l(x′) + N(x′) +max(−C(xд , x′) + 1.0, 0.0)
Two-phase attack: In phase one of this attack, the attacker first
uses a standard grey-box attack to create an adversarial input that
is misclassified. For our analysis, we consider to FGSM, BIM-A,
BIM-B, and C&W attacks for phase one. In the second phase of
the attack, a C& W attack with a modified objective is used to
minimize the norm and maximize the cosine-similarity features
while maintaining misclassification. Let x′(1) be the intermediate
adversarial input created in phase one. Then, the modified objective
for phase two is:
l(x′(1)) = N(x′(1)) +max(−C(xд , x′(1)) + 1.0, 0.0)
where the constraint of misclassification in the updated loss
function is maintained. The selection of the guide input xд in two-
phase attack differs from one-phase attacks in that xд is the training
point that has the maximum cosine-similarity with the adversarial
input produced in phase one by the grey-box attack. That is,
xд = arg max
w∈Xtr
( C(w, x′(1))
We call our two-phase attacks: WB-2 FGSM, WB-2 BIM-A, WB-
2 BIM-B, and WB-2 C&W based on the corresponding grey-box
attack used in phase one. The images created by these attacks are
presented in Fig. 6. Due to the binary nature of the DREBIN dataset,
creating these white-box attacks on the DREBIN dataset requires
significant changes to our optimization algorithms, and hence we
leave DREBIN out of our present evaluation.
The results of our evaluation on the MNIST and CIFAR2 datasets
are presented in the form of ROC-AUC calculations reported in
Table 6, along with the L2 distortion of the adversarial inputs that
bypass our detector. As can be seen, our method is able to suc-
cessfully detect all white-box attacks on the MNIST datasets. The
ROC-AUC of our detector is found to be 87-97%. For practical white-
box attack approaches, these results represent an improvement over
guarantees given by robust-optimization based defenses [27, 36].
The results for CIFAR2 are less promising. We detect different at-
tacks with an AUC of 50-59%. The poor performance of our detector
on CIFAR2 is not fully explainable and we postulate that it is caused
by two reasons: a) the number of training points used for cosine-
similarity scores is low due to computational resource constraints
and b) the distribution of the CIFAR data has a very large support
in the input space. This is also the reason why a number of other
detectors fare poorly on CIFAR [7]. We leave further exploration of
these observations as future work. Despite the poor performance
of our detector on CIFAR images, the success of our detector on
the MNIST dataset shows that building statistical detectors that are
resilient to white-box attacks is possible.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We proposed a new defense against adversarial attacks on DNNs
based on the geometry of the loss surface and the theory of influence
functions. We introduced a new metric called Gradient Similarity
which substitutes the computationally-expensive metric of influ-
ence. A logistic-regression detector based on features that emanate
from gradient similarity allows us to detect inputs crafted by a
zero-knowledge adversary with very high ROC-AUC. Moreover, our
threshold detector is able to detect white-box attacks on the MNIST
dataset with ROC-AUC ranging from 87-97%. Our detector requires
little-to-no-change in the primary network which makes it more
practical when compared to approaches like robust optimization
that require a substantial change in network training.
However, our detector suffers from a few limitations. It is un-
able to detect white-box attacks on CIFAR2. While cross-validation
experiments shows that our detector is able to detect new attack
methods, it has not been evaluated against all possible attack strate-
gies and therefore, no formal claims about its robustness can be
made. The successes and limitations of our detector also raise a
number of open questions around the theory of neural networks.
Specifically, the relationship between network predictions and train-
ing points that exert maximum influence is poorly understood. The
equivalence of behavior between influence and gradient similarity
also raises questions about the properties of the Hessian of the
risk function and its eigenspaces. Exploring the answers to these
questions can lead to a better understanding of neural network
predictions and open doors for the development of strong defenses.
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